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I. INTRODUCTION
Measures to preserve are often the hallmark of times of change.
The 1970's and 1980's have been such a period of change for West-
ern Europe, as those nations-like the United States-move from
an industrial to a post-industrial economy.' In contrast to the eco-
nomic miracle initiated by the Marshall Plan following World War
II, unemployment in Western Europe has risen from approximately
3% to 11% since 1970.2 Indeed, the number of jobs in the ten-coun-
try European Economic Community (EEC) 3 has increased only
one-half of one percent in the past decade.4 Moreover, unemploy-
ment in the EEC is expected to rise to 11.5% in 1985, although the
EEC's gross domestic product is anticipated to increase at a rate of
2.3% in 1985.1 Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the
* Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California. Mr. Carr is chairman
of the Labor Law Committee of the International Bar Association.
** Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California.
1. See, e.g., R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983); D. BELL, THE COM-
ING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973); K. KUMAR, PROPHECY AND PROGRESS: THE SO-
CIOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL AND POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1978); The New Economy, TIME,
May 30, 1983, at 65.
2. The New Economy, supra note 1, at 65.
3. The countries of the European Economic Community are Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Italy, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Greece.
4. The New Economy, supra note 1, at 65.
5. Mixed Economic Trends Forecast For 1985 By E.C. Commission, EUR. COMMUNITY
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1970's and 1980's have been an era of increased legislation designed
to preserve jobs and enhance responsiveness to employee concerns. 6
Multinational enterprises have been a favorite target of such
legislation because they are often perceived as being least subject to
national control. Also, they are often considered to be at the fore-
front of decisions which affect employees in various countries,
through mergers, transfers of operations, and new technologies.
Therefore, in the latter half of the 1970's and in the 1980's, specific
legislative measures have been proposed to augment employee bar-
gaining power and to increase employee consultations in connection
with decisions by multinational enterprises concerning job security
and employee rights.
In 1976, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) adopted the Declaration on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises. 7 One of its best known
sections establishes a set of voluntary guidelines for enhancing the
rights of employees of multinational corporations. 8 In 1977, the In-
NEWS, No. 34/1984 (Nov. 30, 1984). See also EC. Commission Sees Modest Economic
Growth For 1984, EUROPE: MAGAZINE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Jan./Feb. 1984, at
49; E.C Releases Annual Economic Forecast, EUR. COMMUNITY NEWS, No. 17/1983 (Nov. 1,
1983).
6. Since 1970, the European Economic Community has adopted or proposed a
number of labor directives designed to preserve jobs and protect employees, including the
Council Directive of 17 February 1975 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) (1975); Council
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of Member States Relating to the Safeguarding
of Employees' Rights in the Event of Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of
Businesses, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 177) 187 (Feb. 14, 1977); The Vredeling Proposal, infra
note 10; The Fifth Directive, infra note 16.
7. OECD Doc. PRESS/A(76)20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Declaration on Inter-
national Investment].
8. Id. The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises [hereinafter cited as the Guide-
lines], reprinted in R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 137-44 (1977), are an annex to the Declaration and are an
integral part of the Declaration. Within the Guidelines, the section entitled Employment
and Industrial Relations provides that enterprises should "respect the right of their employ-
ees, to be represented by trade unions" or other employee organizations; provide facilities to
employee representatives "to assist in the development of effective collective agreements"
and provide employee representatives with information which is necessary for meaningful
negotiations on conditions of employment; provide to employee representatives information
which enables them to obtain "a true and fair view of the performance of the entity;" "ob-
serve standards of employment and industrial relations not less favourable than those ob-
served by comparable employers in the host country;" provide reasonable notice of changes
which would have "major effects upon the livelihood of their employees" and cooperate in
mitigating the adverse effects of those changes; implement their employment policies with-
out discrimination; and enable authorized representatives to conduct negotiations with man-
[Vol. 7:1
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ternational Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Tripartite Decla-
ration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy which also sets forth guidelines concerning the treatment of
employees. 9 However, the body which has taken the greatest inter-
est in proposing labor directives for multinational corporations has
been the EEC.
Since 1976, the EEC has adopted and proposed various labor
directives designed to increase management consultation with em-
ployees and to protect workers against the possible adverse effects of
mergers, dismissals, or other events which affect them. The most
controversial of these, the Vredeling Proposal,' 0 was approved by
the European Commission" on June 16, 1983, and has now been
submitted to the European Council of Ministers' 2 for its considera-
tion for final adoption.' 3 The Vredeling Proposal would obligate
the parent company of a transnational enterprise' 4 to transmit annu-
ally to its subsidiaries within the EEC various types of information
concerning its operations and financial condition. It would also re-
quire the parent company to advise its subsidiaries of any decisions
likely to seriously affect the interests of the subsidiaries' employees
so that the subsidiaries can consult with the employees' representa-
tives before the decision is implemented.
15
agement representatives "who are authorized to take decisions on the matters under
negotiation." Id. paras. 2-4, 6, 7, 9.
9. Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and So-
cial Policy (Nov. 30, 1977), paras. 21-23, 26-28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 42, 46-48, 51, 52, 54-
58, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, No. 2 (Mar. 1978).
10. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Con-
sulting Employees. COM (83) 292 final (July 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as the Vredeling
Proposal].
11. The European Commission is composed of 14 members who are to be independent
from the member states. Treaty of Rome art. 157. It is responsible for drafting the measures
taken by the Council of Ministers; ensures that the provisions of the Treaty of Rome (which
established the EEC) and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant to the treaty are
applied; formulates recommendations on matters addressed in the Treaty of Rome; and ex-
ercises powers conferred upon it by the Council for the implementation of the Council's
rules. Treaty of Rome art. 155.
12. The Council of Ministers has broad powers to "take decisions," including the
power to adopt proposals made by the Commission. It is composed of representatives from
each of the member states. Treaty of Rome art. 145.
13. See Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10; E. C. Commission Approves Amended Version
of Worker Right's Proposal, EUR. COMMUNITY NEWS, No. 9/83 (June 16, 1983).
14. The Proposal only covers enterprises with respect to which the parent enterprise
and its subsidiaries collectively employ at least 1,000 workers in the EEC. Vredeling Propo-
sal, supra note 10, art. 2(l).
15. See Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, arts. 3 & 4.
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On July 28, 1983, the European Commission approved a revi-
sion of a controversial draft addressing worker participation. This
revised directive would require larger firms to guarantee worker
participation by (1) creating a separate supervisory board with em-
ployee membership, (2) maintaining a single board with some mem-
bers allocated to supervisory roles (some of which would represent
employees), (3) creating employee representative bodies for consul-
tations, or (4) entering collective bargaining agreements subject to
minimum standards for employee participation. 16 This proposal has
also been submitted to the European Council of Ministers for con-
sideration for final adoption.' 7
Finally, the European Commission is expected to submit to the
Council of Ministers a draft of a directive known as the "Ninth
Company Law Directive."' 8  This directive would establish a new
set of parent-subsidiary relationships through "control contracts."
The directive would encourage parent companies to acquire the
right to manage their EEC subsidiaries in the interests of the group
through such "control contracts" by subjecting the parent compa-
nies to additional liabilities if they do not. 19
Proposals of this type, however, run risks. Despite their lauda-
ble goals (i.e., enhanced protection for employees and others), such
legislative initiatives must be carefully drafted so that they do not
provide too much protection. Where protection is so great that it
discourages change (rather than mitigating its consequences), it can
16. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on article 54(3)(g) of the EEC
Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obliga-
tions of Their Organs. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (Sept. 9, 1983).
17. Id. at 2; see supra note 12.
18. The official version of the Ninth Company Law Directive has not yet been pub-
lished; however, various drafts have been leaked. Accordingly, the proposal can thus only
be discussed in broad terms since it is subject to revision until an official version is an-
nounced. In this Article, citations will be to the Commission's 1983 draft of the Ninth
Directive.
19. According to the 1983 draft of the Ninth Directive, a parent company which fails to
enter into a "control contract" with its subsidiaries in the EEC, and which directly or indi-
rectly exercises a decisive influence over the decision-making of the management body of a
subsidiary, would be "regarded as a defacto member of the management body" of the sub-
sidiary. Art. 6(2). The parent would be liable to the subsidiary "for any damage resulting
from such interference and attributable to mismanagement, under the same conditions as if
the undertaking were a member of the management body" of the subsidiary. Art. 6(1).
Additionally, each member of the management body of the parent company would, together
with the parent, bear joint and several unlimited liability, which could only be relieved if the
member proved that the influence giving rise to the subsidiary's damage is not attributable
to him. Art. 6(3)(a).
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retard improvement of the very condition which necessitates the
protection. Each of the foregoing initiatives establishes a different
balance between protection and change. That balance will signifi-
cantly influence the prospects for successfully weathering the cur-
rent economic storm in Europe.
II. THE OECD's DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
Established on December 14, 1960, the OECD is the successor
to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which ad-
ministered the Marshall Plan. The OECD is comprised of twenty-
four nations.2
0
On June 21, 1976, the OECD adopted the Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises2 1 which annexed
a set of guidelines for multinational enterprises. The most signifi-
cant of the guidelines are in the chapter on Employment and Indus-
trial Relations, 22 not only because of their subject matter but
because they have been invoked more often and with more publicity
than the guidelines in other chapters.2 3 Although the guidelines are
voluntary, members of the OECD are encouraged to publicize and
promote adherence to them. The OECD recommends that multina-
tional enterprises publicly state their acceptance of the guidelines,
24
and a number of them have done so in their financial reports.
A. The OECD's Guidelines on Employment and Industrial
Relations
The OECD's guidelines on Employment and Industrial Rela-
tions are specifically designed to protect employees from the conse-
quences of economic change. 25 They accomplish this by using three
20. The OECD is composed of the following nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Ca-
nada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
21. See supra note 7.
22. See supra note 8.
23. See Mid-Term Report on the 1976 Declaration and Decisions of International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD, 1982, para. 20; Wakkie, Some Comments
on the Impact of the OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises on European Employ-
ment Relations, 2 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 75, 79, 81-89 (1979).
24. See OECD's Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises, June 13-14, 1979, para. 9.
25. OECD Declaration on International Investment and the annexed Guidelines for
1984]
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devices: (1) Increased disclosure of information to assist employees
in negotiations; (2) reasonable notification to employee representa-
tives of changes in operations in order to mitigate their adverse ef-
fects; and (3) increased employee access to the decision-making
authority of the multinational enterprise.
The disclosure provisions reflect the drafters' concern that the
information which a subsidiary provides to its employees may be
inadequate. Accordingly, paragraph 3 of the section entitled Em-
ployment and Industrial Relations recommends that employee rep-
resentatives be provided with information "which enables them to
obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity or,
where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole," 26 and paragraph 2(b)
provides that enterprises should, within the framework of the law of
the host country, provide employee representatives with information
necessary to conduct meaningful negotiations on the conditions of
employment. 2
7
The European trade union movement has pressed for the dis-
semination of more information to employee representatives based
partly upon an economic theory which one representative calls
"Keynes plus." 28 According to this theory, because West European
economies are no longer growing significantly, unions must negoti-
ate a redistribution of the fixed pie of wealth, rather than expect
increased wealth from a growing pie. The dissemination of more
information is viewed as a means to improve the bargaining power
of employees to negotiate such a redistribution. Interestingly, the
more radical members of the European trade union movement op-
Multinational Enterprises, Chapter on Employment and Industrial Relations, supra note 8,
paras. 3, 5, 6, 9.
26. Id para. 3. The full text of paragraph 3 provides:
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which they operate,
3. provide to representatives of employees where this accords with local law and
practice, information which enables them to obtain a true and fair view of the
performance of the entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole. ...
Id.
27. Id. para. 2(b). The text of paragraph 2(b) provides:
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which they operate,
2(b). provide to representatives of employees information which is needed for
meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment.
Id
28. Interview with Steven Pursey, Economist, International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, Brussels (May 5, 1981).
[Vol. 7:1
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pose such disclosure policies because they view a redistribution of
wealth as a means of co-opting the trade union movement into the
capitalist system.
29
The next device used in the guidelines is a notification provi-
sion.30 It is intended to give employees of multinational enterprises
advance notice of decisions which might affect their employment
status and thereby give them an opportunity to mitigate any adverse
effects through negotiation. This provision reflects employee con-
cern over the loss of jobs in the 1970's caused by mergers and clo-
sures of which employees received no notice. Consequently,
paragraph 6 recommends that in considering changes in their opera-
tions which would have "major effects upon the livelihood of their
employees," such as plant closures or employee dismissals, enter-
prises should provide reasonable notice and cooperate with em-
ployee representatives to mitigate "to the maximum extent
practicable adverse effects." 31
Finally, the third type of provision giving employees access to
the decision-making authority of the multinational corporation, is
premised on the assumption that the parent company of a multina-
tional enterprise occasionally makes decisions which affect its sub-
sidiaries' employees, and that, accordingly, those employees should
have the opportunity to negotiate with the body authorized to make
those decisions. 32 Paragraph 9 of the section entitled Employment
29. Id.
30. See Guidelines, supra note 8, para. 6. The full text of paragraph 6 provides:
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which they operate,
6. in considering changes in their operations which would have major effects upon
the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the case of the closure of an
entity involving collective lay-offs or dismissals, provide reasonable notice of such
changes to representatives of their employees, and where appropriate to the rele-
vant governmental authorities, and co-operate with the employee representatives
and appropriate governmental authorities so as to mitigate to the maximum extent
practicable adverse effects. ...
Id.
31. Id
32. Id. para. 9. The text of paragraph 9 provides:
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which they operate,
9. enable authorized representatives of their employees to conduct negotiations on
collective bargaining or labour management relations issues with representatives of
management who are authorized to take decisions on the matters under
negotiations.
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and Industrial Relations recommends that enterprises allow author-
ized employee representatives to conduct negotiations with repre-
sentatives of management "who are authorized to make decisions on
the matters under negotiations." 33 Paragraph 8 of the Introduction
to the Guidelines recognizes that multinational enterprises are com-
prised of entities, one or more of which may be able to exercise sig-
nificant influence over others.34 When construed together, these
provisions encourage employee access to the decision-making au-
thority of the enterprise.
B. Cases Construing the Guidelines
The OECD Declaration has had its greatest impact in decisions
construing the guidelines. The Committee on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises (IME Committee) is responsi-
ble for interpreting the Declaration on International Investment and
the annexed guidelines.35 An interpretation usually arises in the
context of a particular case concerning the conduct of a certain mul-
tinational enterprise. While the IME Committee may not take a po-
33. Id
34. Guidelines, supra note 8, Introduction. Paragraph 8 of the Introduction to the
Guidelines states:
A precise legal definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the pur-
poses of the guidelines. These usually comprise companies or other entities whose
ownership is private, state or mixed, established in different countries and so linked
that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over the
activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge and resources with the
others. The degree of autonomy of each entity in relation to the others varies
widely from one multinational enterprise to another, depending on the nature of
the links between such entities and the fields of activity concerned. For these rea-
sons, the guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the multinational enter-
prise (parent companies and/or local entities) according to the actual distribution of
responsibilities among them on the understanding that they will co-operate and pro-
vide assistance to one another as necessary to facilitate observance of the guide-
lines. The word 'enterprise' as used in these guidelines refers to these various
entities in accordance with their responsibilities.
Id. para. 8 (emphasis added).
35. The IME Committee was established by a resolution of the Council of the OECD,
which consists of representatives from all member states. Resolution of the Council Estab-
lishing a Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD
Doc. C(74)247 (1975). The purpose of the Committee is to supervise implementation of the
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, and to coordinate
consultation among governments concerning it. Although business and labor organizations
cannot be members of the OECD, employers have formed the Business and Industry Advi-
sory Committee (BIAC) and trade unions have established the Trade Union Advisory Com-
mittee (TUAC), which enjoy consultative status at the OECD. Wakkie, supra note 23, at 77.
In their roles, BIAC and TUAC are permitted to request an interpretation of the Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises from the IME Committee.
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sition on the conduct of the particular enterprise involved and will
therefore address the issues without reference to that enterprise,
36 its
interpretations have considerable moral force because they receive
broad support from governments, employers and trade unions.
37
Moreover, the parties to the dispute will often announce how the
Committee's construction of the guidelines supports their position,
and conduct perceived to be in violation of the guidelines can dam-
age the offender's reputation. 38
One of the earliest cases construing the OECD's guidelines is
known as the Badger case,39 in which the IME Committee inter-
preted paragraph 8 of the Introduction to the Guidelines. Para-
graph 8 provides that multinational enterprises are entities that are
so linked that one or more might be able to exercise significant influ-
ence over the activities of the others.40 In Badger, Badger Company,
Inc., an affiliate of a Massachusetts corporation, had a Belgian sub-
sidiary, Badger (Belgium) N.V.4 1 When the Belgian subsidiary had
to be closed down, 250 employees were dismissed. 42 Although Bel-
gian law provided that dismissed employees were entitled to sever-
ance pay, the subsidiary was only able to pay a portion of the
36. Article 3 of the Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation Pro-
cedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in R. BLANPAIN, THE
BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 46 (1977),
states: "The Committee shall not reach conclusions on the conduct of individual
enterprises."
37. See Wakkie, supra note 23, at 83-85; OECD's Review of the 1976 Declaration,
supra note 24.
38. For instance, the Belgian government announced the committee's decision in the
Badger case, and the trade unions have publicly argued how the outcome in the British
Oxygen case justified their position. See Wakkie, supra note 23, at 83-84.
39. The Badger case, written question number 323/77 of June 29, 1977 (Mr. Van der
Hek), and the answer of the Commission, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 246) 17, 18 (Sept. 14,
1977). There is, however, no official source which states the facts of the Badger case (or of
any other case considered by the IME Committee) partly because the Committee is not
permitted to reach conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises. See supra note 36.
Instead, the IME Committee only publishes its legal analysis of the guidelines in issue in the
case.
The facts of the Badger case are discussed at length in R. BLANPAIN, supra note 36, at
55-56, and in Wakkie, supra note 23, at 83-84. Professor Blanpain's rendition of the facts is
the most exhaustive since the Belgian Secretary of State for Regional Economy, Professor
Dr. Mark Eyskens, appointed Professor Blanpain advisor for the Badger case. In that capac-
ity, Professor Blanpain helped to prepare the Belgian point of view for the OECD meetings
on the case and was actively involved in negotiations between Badger Company, Inc., and
the Belgian trade unions. R. BLANPAIN, supra note 36, Introductory Remarks.
40. Introduction to the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Supra note 34, para. 8.
41. R. BLANPAIN, supra note 36, at 51, 67.
42. Id at 51.
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amount required by law.43 The Belgian Government then requested
that the parent, Badger Company, Inc., provide the funds to pay the
balance.44 When it refused on the grounds of limited liability, the
Belgian Government raised the matter before the IME Committee.45
At the end of the meeting, the Belgian delegation to the IME Com-
mittee stated that it was concluded, inter alia, that "a parent com-
pany is, under certain circumstances, morally responsible for the
liabilities of its local entities. '' 4 6 After the meeting, the Belgian Gov-
ernment and Badger Company, Inc. entered into negotiations and
agreed upon a settlement amounting to approximately twenty-five
million Belgian francs 47 to satisfy the subsidiary's obligation to pro-
vide severance pay.48
In another case before the IME Committee, the Hertz Rent-A-
Car Company case, 49 the Committee interpreted a guideline which
provided that enterprises should not threaten to transfer all or part
of an operating unit in an attempt to influence negotiations unfairly
or to discourage worker organization.50 In Hertz, the Hertz Rent-A-
Car Company transferred employees from its other European
branches to Denmark to replace Danish employees who had gone
on strike, demanding a salary increase.5' Although paragraph 8 of
the Employment and Industrial Relations Chapter referred to a
threat to transfer all or part of an operating unit to influence negotia-
43. Id at 51, 75, 76, 81; Wakkie, supra note 23, at 83.
44. R. BLANPAIN, supra note 36, at 51, 105-08; Wakkie, supra note 23, at 83.
45. R. BLANPAIN, supra note 36, at 51, 112-13; Wakkie, supra note 23, at 84.
46. R. BLANPAIN, supra note 36, at 116-17; Wakkie, supra note 23, at 84-85.
47. Wakkie, supra note 23, at 85.
48. As we will argue, the EEC's draft Ninth Directive, supra note 18, is also intended to
address this type of issue.
49. The Hertz-Rent-A-Car case, EUR. COMM. Doc. 424/76, Nov. 15, 1976; EUR. PARL.
RES. of Nov. 16, 1976, Official Journal 1976, C. 293/12; Debates, same date, at 46-51. The
facts of this case are recited in R. BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1976-1979 at 219-24 (1979). See also Wakkie, supra
note 23, at 82.
50. Guidelines, supra note 8, para. 8. Paragraph 8, as originally worded, provided:
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labor
relations and employment practices, in each of the countries in which they operate,
8. in the context of bona fide negotiations with representatives of employees on
conditions of employment, or while employees are exercising a right to organize,
not threaten to utilize a capacity to transfer the whole or part of an operating unit
from the country concerned in order to influence unfairly those negotiations or to
hinder the exercise of a right to organize ...
Id
51. Wakkie, supra note 23, at 82; R. BLANPAIN, supra note 49, at 221.
[Vol. 7:1
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tions, it did not address the transfer of employees to achieve the
same end, and therefore did not expressly address the circumstances
in the Hertz case.52
After reviewing the case, the IME Committee stated that the
Hertz Company's conduct "would not be in conformity with the
general spirit and approach" of the guidelines and recommended
that paragraph 8 be amended to include a prohibition against the
transfer of employees between an enterprise's foreign subsidiaries in
order to influence negotiations unfairly. 53 The OECD governments
then amended the guidelines to reflect the Committee's
recommendation. 54
One of the most controversial cases decided under the OECD
Declaration and guidelines is known as the British Oxygen case, 55 in
which the IME Committee interpreted the guidelines relating to em-
ployee access to an enterprise's decision-making authority. In that
case, when British Oxygen decided to cancel a future investment
plan which it had contemplated with respect to its Swedish subsidi-
ary, Viggo, the trade unions argued that it had an obligation to ne-
gotiate with the local employee representatives in Sweden.56
The dispute came before the IME Committee on March 6,
1980.17 The Committee held that paragraph 8 of the Introduction to
the Guidelines, together with paragraph 9 of the Employment and
Industrial Relations Chapter, reaffirmed that parent companies are
expected to take necessary steps to enable their subsidiaries to ob-
serve the guidelines by providing them with adequate and timely
information and ensuring that the management representatives at
52. OECD's Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises, supra note 24, at 70, reprinted in R. BLANPAIN, supra
note 49, at 226-27.
53. Id
54. Id at 227.
55. Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, "Applica-
tion of Paragraph 9 of the Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines to Investment
Matters." IME (80) 23 (Dec. 10, 1980); Mid-Term Report on the 1976 Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, supra note 23, at 61-
64.
56. Interview with Hans Piehl, then head of the department responsible for company
law, democratization of economy and multinationals, at the European Trade Union Corpo-
ration, Brussels (May 5, 1981); OECD's Review of the 1976 Declaration, supra note 24.
57. Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, "Applica-
tion of Paragraph 9," supra note 55; Mid-Term Report on the 1976 Declaration and Deci-
sions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, supra note 23, at 61-64.
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the national or local level have sufficient authority to negotiate.58
The Committee stressed that paragraph 9 was carefully worded to
"avoid the need for defining the locus of the negotiations or the
proper level of management to be involved." 59 This would depend,
according to the Committee, upon the decision-making structure of
the particular multinational enterprise. 60 It concluded that an enter-
prise has a range of possible means to insure that negotiations are
conducted in a meaningful manner:
(1) The enterprise can "provide the management of the subsid-
iary with adequate and timely information and . . . insure that it
has sufficient powers to conduct meaningful negotiations with repre-
sentatives of employees";
(2) the enterprise can "nominate one or more representative[s]
of the decision-making center to the negotiating team of the subsidi-
ary"; and
(3) the enterprise's management can "engage directly in negoti-
ations" with the local employee representatives.
6'
The most controversial of the suggestions in British Oxygen was
that of direct negotiations between local employee representatives
and the management of the decision-making center. In the view of
management, such an alternative would diminish the authority of
the subsidiary to negotiate with its employees in the future and
would encourage local employee representatives to "leapfrog" local
management. The effect of that suggestion, however, was softened
by the first two options and the Committee's recognition that these
means were not exclusive. 62 Both British Oxygen and the trade un-
ions, therefore, hailed the decision as a victory. British Oxygen ar-
gued that the trade unions' contention that they should be permitted
to negotiate directly with the management of the parent company
had been rejected, 63 while the trade unions could claim as a victory
58. Id
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id
62. The IME Committee expressly stated that the management of the enterprise
"would seem to have a range of possibilities among which it would choose or that it could
combine" in carrying out its responsibilities for providing access to the enterprise's decision-
making authority. In identifying specific options available to ensure that negotiations are
conducted in a meaningful manner, the Committee stated that those were simply "exam-
ples" of the alternatives. Application of Paragraph 9, supra note 55, at 3.
63. Interviews at British Oxygen, Hammersmith House, in Hammersmith W6 England
(May 26, 1981).
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the IME Committee's recognition that direct negotiation with the
parent could be appropriate. 64
The Phi/ips case 65 further tightened the construction of the em-
ployee access guideline. In that case, involving the closure of a sub-
sidiary of Philips in Finland, the Committee stated that where
management representatives negotiate without the authority to
make decisions on the matters under negotiation, the enterprise has
acted contrary to the guidelines.66
While some of the cases under the OECD guidelines have been
controversial, the fairness of the guidelines themselves has been ap-
plauded by both industry and labor.67 Many companies agree that
the OECD guidelines provide both flexibility and guidance for em-
ployment relations.68
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION'S TRIPARTITE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is a tripartite or-
ganization in which governments, employers and employees are
represented. 69 Its express objective is to improve the economic and
social position of workers and to safeguard employees' rights.70
On November 16, 1977, the ILO adopted the Tripartite Decla-
ration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and So-
64. Interview with Hans Piehl, supra note 56. The issue of employee access to the deci-
sion-making authority is also addressed in the Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10. A clause
in a previous draft of the Vredeling Proposal, which authorized direct negotiations between
a subsidiary's employees' representative and the management of the parent company, how-
ever, has been deleted in the revised draft which was approved by the European Commis-
sion last year. See former draft, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) art. 6(5) (1980).
65. Trade Union Advisory Committee Statement for the Mid-Term Report on the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, paras. 21 & 36 (Oct. 1981).
66. Id.
67. See Mid-Term Report on the 1976 Declaration and Decisions on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises, supra note 23, at 13-14.
68. OECD Review of the 1976 Declaration, supra note 24; Interviews at Ford Werke
Kon, Koln, Federal Republic of Germany (May 19, 1981); Bundesverband der Deutshen
Industrie, Koln, Federal Republic of Germany (May 19, 1981); Shell Warme GmbH,
Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany (May 21, 1981).
69. The ILO was formed as a part of the system established by the League of Nations
after World War I. See J.T. SHOTWELL, THE ORIGIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR OR-
GANIZATION (1934).
70. See ILO CONST. From 1977 to 1980, the United States refused to participate in the
ILO because it believed that the ILO had become too politicized. The United States re-
joined when that trend was reversed. See Landy, The Implementation Procedures of the In-
ternational Labor Organization, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 633 (1980).
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cial Policy, 7' in which multinational enterprises were recommended
to observe the policies stated in the declaration on a voluntary ba-
sis.72 Like the OECD Guidelines upon which it was partly based,7 3
the Tripartite Declaration provides for (1) increased disclosure of
information to enable employee representatives to accurately assess
the performance of the entity so that they can meaningfully negoti-
ate,74 (2) reasonable notification to employees of changes in opera-
tions,75 and (3) employee access to the enterprise's decision-making
authority.76
71. Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and So-
cial Policy, supra note 9 [hereinafter cited as Tripartite Declaration of Principles].
72. The preamble to the Tripartite Declaration of Principles "invites" governments of
state members of the ILO, organizations of employers and workers, and multinational enter-
prises operating within their territories to observe the principles embodied therein. Para-
graph 5 of the Preamble specifically states that the principles "are intended to guide the
governments, employers' and workers' organizations and the multinational enterprises in
taking such measures and actions and adopting such policies. . . as would further social
progress." Id.
73. Although the ILO commenced its work on the Tripartite Declaration of Principles
before the OECD established the IME Committee for purposes of preparing the Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, agreement among governments, business organizations and
trade unions was reached on the OECD guidelines before the adoption of the Tripartite
Declaration of Principles. Indeed, adoption of the OECD's guidelines helped clear the way
for the enactment of similar provisions in the Tripartite Declaration of Principles. See
OECD's Review of the 1976 Declaration, supra note 24, para. 30; Letter from William With-
erell, Deputy Director, Financial, Fiscal, and Enterprise Affairs of the OECD (Apr. 19,
1982).
74. Tripartite Declaration of Principles, supra note 9, para. 54. Paragraph 54 provides:
Multinational enterprises should provide workers' representatives with information
required for meaningful negotiations with the entity involved and, where this ac-
cords with local law and practices, should also provide information to enable them
to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity, or where appropri-
ate, of the enterprise as a whole.
Id
75. Tripartite Declaration of Principles, supra note 9, para. 26. Paragraph 26 provides:
In considering changes in operations (including those resulting from mergers, take-
overs or transfers of production) which would have major employment effects,
multinational enterprises should provide reasonable notice of such changes to the
appropriate government authorities and representatives of the workers in their em-
ployment and their organizations so that the implications may be examined jointly
in order to mitigate adverse effects to the greatest possible extent. This is particu-
larly important in the case of the closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or
dismissals.
Id This paragraph resembles paragraph 6 of the Employment and Industrial Relations
Chapter of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 30.
76. Tripartite Declaration of Principles, supra note 9, para. 51. Paragraph 51 provides:
"Multinational enterprises should enable duly authorized representatives of the workers in
their employment in each of the countries in which they operate to conduct negotiations
with representatives of management who are authorized to take decisions on the matters
under negotiation." Id This paragraph is identical to paragraph 9 of the Employment and
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IV. LABOR DIRECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY
The EEC, now composed of ten nations, 77 has been at the fore-
front in proposing legislation relating to employee relations for mul-
tinational enterprises. At one level, this is a result of the concern of
various commissioners of the European Commission 78 over the abil-
ity of multinational enterprises, whose decision-making center is in
one country, to make decisions which affect employees in another.
79
Since article 100 of the Treaty of Rome8 ° grants the EEC the power
to issue directives8' to harmonize laws between the member states
which "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the Com-
mon Market," 82 the EEC was deemed the appropriate body to con-
trol the perceived abuses of multinational companies.8 3 Through its
directives, the EEC could set certain minimum standards which all
member states were obliged to enact in their national legislation.
Such minimum standards could therefore apply to all of an enter-
prise's subsidiaries within the EEC, regardless of the state in which
each was located.
At another level, however, the EEC's concentration on labor
Industrial Relations Chapter of the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra
note 32.
77. See supra note 3.
78. See supra note 1I.
79. Interview with Robert Coleman, then employed in the Commission's Directorate-
General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, European Commission, Brussels (May 4,
1981).
80. The Treaty of Rome, executed on March 25, 1957, established the European Eco-
nomic Community, then comprising six member states and now expanded to ten. See supra
note 3. The EEC is commonly known as the Common Market. The purpose of the treaty
was to establish a common market among the member states through the harmonization of
their economic policies and activities, and thereby promote economic and social progress.
See Preamble and Treaty of Rome art. 2. The principal features of the Common Market
include the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and
export of goods among the member states; the establishment of a common customs tariff and
common commercial policy toward third countries; the achievement of freedom of move-
ment for persons, services and capital among the member states; and the adoption of a
common policy in the sphere of agriculture. See Treaty of Rome art. 3.
81. In contrast with a regulation which is "binding in its entirety and directly applica-
ble in all member states," a "directive," while "binding as to the result," leaves to the na-
tional authorities the choice of "form and methods." Treaty of Rome art. 189.
82. Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome provides: The Council shall, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such provi-
sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.
83. Interview with Robert Coleman, supra note 79.
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legislation relating to multinational enterprises is the result of a shift
in emphasis, if not philosophy, within the EEC. The EEC was origi-
nally based on a growth model: The Treaty of Rome, the source of
the EEC's power, manifested the belief that the reduction of cus-
toms barriers between the member states and the free movement of
labor and capital would promote competition and spur growth, just
as the more sophisticated customs union established by the United
States Constitution 84 has promoted economic growth here. 85 With
the 1973-74 oil embargo and the ensuing reduction in economic
growth,86 however, the EEC shifted its legislative efforts from
growth to social welfare and labor goals. Indeed, article 100 of the
Treaty of Rome has been used in a manner analogous to the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution: both provisions,
originally intended as jurisdictional bases for legislation harmoniz-
ing trade between states, have now also served as jurisdictional
sources of social and labor legislation.87 Like the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which was jurisdictionally based upon the Commerce Clause,
the Vredeling Proposal of the EEC illustrates a broader jurisdic-
tional basis of article 100.88
84. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
85. From 1965 to 1975, the gross domestic product of France rose at an annual percent-
age rate of 4.7, Italy at 4.1, the Netherlands at 4.4, Belgium at 4.1, and Germany at 3.2.
BASIC STATISTICS OF THE COMMUNITY 28 (table 17) (15th ed. 1977). In contrast, the gross
domestic product of the United Kingdom and Denmark, which did not enter the EEC until
1973, rose at an annual rate during the period of 2.2 and 3.2, respectively. Id Of course,
other factors are also responsible for the differences in growth during this period.
86. See Darby, The Price Of Oil And World Inflation And Recession, 72 AM. EcON.
REV. 738 (1982).
87. Originally, the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, was intended to
harmonize trade between the states by restraining them from imposing duties and levies on
activities affecting interstate commerce. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton), No. 42 (J.
Madison). During and after the 1930's, however, the Commerce Clause became a constitu-
tional justification for New Deal legislation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). Later, the Commerce Clause was relied upon as a source of constitu-
tional authority for civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Analogously,
although article 100 of the Treaty of Rome provides for the harmonization of laws in order
to enhance the functioning of the Common Market, in the past decade it has more fre-
quently been used to justify social and labor legislation. For instance, in addition to the
Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, it has been used as a jurisdictional justification for the
proposed uniform products liability directive, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 241) (Oct. 14,
1976).
88. See supra note 87.
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A. The Vredeling Proposal
The most controversial of the EEC's proposed labor directives
is the Vredeling Proposal. This proposal, entitled "A Directive on
Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees," 89 is named
after the Dutch Commissioner for Social Affairs, Mr. Henk Vredel-
ing, who, with Commissioner Davignon, first proposed the directive.
On June 16, 1983, the European Commission approved an amended
version of the measure and submitted it to the Council of Ministers
to consider its adoption.90
The Vredeling Proposal9' would require the parent company92
of a multinational enterprise93 to report information to its subsidiar-
ies on two types of instances. First, the parent company would be
required to annually transmit various types of information about its
operations and financial condition to the management of each of its
subsidiaries located within the EEC. The information, to be trans-
mitted on an annual basis, must give a clear picture "of the activities
of the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries as a whole" 94 and re-
late to (1) the parent company's structure, (2) its economic and fi-
nancial situation, (3) the probable development of the business and
of production and sales, (4) the employment situation and projected
trends, and (5) investment prospects. 95 If the management of a sub-
sidiary does not submit the information to the employee representa-
tives within thirty days, the representatives may submit a written
request to the parent company for the relevant information. 96 Sec-
ond, the proposal would require the parent company to apprise its
subsidiaries of any decisions likely to have serious consequences on
their employees' interests before those decisions are implemented.
This is intended to provide the subsidiaries an opportunity to con-
sult with their employees.97
The proposal sets forth a timetable for disclosure by the parent
89. See supra note 10.
90. See supra note 13.
91. See supra note 10.
92. A parent company is one which satisfies the criteria defining a parent company
under the Seventh Council Directive. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) art. I (July 18, 1983).
See Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, art. I.
93. See supra note 14.
94. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, arts. 3 & 4.
95. Id. art. 3(1).
96. Id art. 3(2).
97. Id art. 3(5). In addition, member states would be obligated to enact "appropriate"
penalties for failure to comply with these provisions. Id art. 3(7).
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company to its subsidiaries for meaningful consultations between its
subsidiaries and their employee representatives as to those decisions
liable to have serious consequences for the interests of the subsidiar-
ies' employees. 98 The parent company must transmit information99
relating to the matter in question to the subsidiary concerned "in
good time" before a final decision is taken.100 The management of
each subsidiary must then transmit the information to its employee
representatives, request their opinion within a period of at least
thirty days, and hold consultations with them "with a view to at-
tempting to reach agreement."' 0'
Each state is to implement procedures for the employees' repre-
sentatives to bring proceedings before a court or tribunal to compel
the management of the parent or subsidiary to comply with these
duties. 102 Where the management of a parent company is located
outside of the EEC, the management must appoint an agent who is
responsible for fulfilling the requirements under the proposal, or the
management of each subsidiary concerned will be held
responsible. 103
Confidential information, defined as information, which "if dis-
closed, could substantially damage the undertaking's interests or
lead to the failure of its plans," can be withheld.1°4 The mem-
98. Id. art. 4.
99. Specifically, the information transmitted to the management of the subsidiary must
relate to "the grounds for the proposed decision," "the legal, economic and social conse-
quences of such decision for the employees concerned," and "the measures planned in re-
spect of such employees." Id art. 4(1).
100. Id.
101. 1d. art. 4(3)
102. Id art. 4(4). Since the proposal is in the form of a directive, see supra note 81,
specific measures to implement it will not be enacted until after its adoption by the Council
of Ministers.
103. Id. art. 2(2). While this provision attempts to avoid the proposal's extraterritorial
reach to those parent companies located outside the EEC, however, it may deny due process
to companies within the EEC. Where a subsidiary within the EEC is penalized because of
its parent company's failure to comply with the directive, the minority shareholders of that
subsidiary will be unfairly penalized for the omissions of a party outside their control and
beyond the jurisdiction of the EEC.
104. Id art. 7(1). The definition of "confidential information" is both narrow and
broad. It is narrow because, in the words of the United States Industry Coordinating
Group, it "ignores the fact that, in reaching such a judgment, managers must consider not
only whether disclosure of the terms of information concerned would be substantially harm-
ful to the company, but also whether its disclosure would involve a breach of the company's
legal obligations, either under contract or legislation." Statement by the U.S. Industry Co-
ordinating Group concerning the Vredeling Proposal 5 (Mar. 1983). On the other hand, the
definition is broad because disclosure of the very types of decisions covered by the Vredeling
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ber states must establish tribunals to settle disputes over
confidentiality. 105
Finally, the proposed directive encourages the creation of mul-
tinational employee bodies. 106 If a body exists representing employ-
ees at a level higher than that of the subsidiary, the directive
provides that the information to be disseminated under the directive
must be given to that body, and where authorized by the employee
representative, consultations are to be held at that level. 10 7 Agree-
ments establishing the formation of bodies representing all employ-
ees in a multinational enterprise are also authorized.10
As is readily apparent, this proposal goes beyond the provisions
of the ILO Tripartite Declaration and OECD Guidelines. These
latter instruments merely provide for reasonable notice of changes
in operations in order to mitigate their adverse eyfects. In contrast,
the Vredeling Proposal requires management to consult with em-
ployees concerning the measures themselves, not merely their effects.
This obligation has aroused particular resistance from employer or-
ganizations. 10 9 They argue that notification of such changes might
simply give unions advance notice within which to organize their
opposition to the change. This argument convinced the United
States Supreme Court to hold that bargaining over a decision to
close a facility was not mandatory under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB."0
In First National Maintenance Corp., the Supreme Court noted
that mandatory bargaining is premised upon the belief that collec-
tive discussions "will result in decisions that are better for both
management and labor and for society as a whole," but that this
would only be true if the subject proposed for discussion is amena-
ble to resolution through the bargaining process."'I This will not be
Proposal, such as closures and mergers, could "lead to [their] failure" (and thus qualify as
confidential information) because disclosure could provoke trade union activity designed to
block the decision.
105. Id art. 7(3).
106. Although the proposal does not describe how such multinational employee bodies
are to be established, if such a body is established, the member states are authorized to limit
the subsidiaries' obligations under the proposed directive and to allow those obligations to
be satisfied at the higher level. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, art. 5(4).
107. Id art. 5(l), (2).
108. Id art. 5(3).
109. Statement by U.S. Industry Coordinating Group on the Vredeling Proposal 2 (Mar.
1983).
110. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
Ill. 1d. at678.
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the case where a decision is made to close a particular facility, be-
cause the union's principal purpose in participating in consultations
will be largely to delay or halt the decision, not to assist in making a
better one." 12 Accordingly, the Court concluded that it is not appro-
priate to require the employer to bargain over the actual decision to
close a facility, although it might be appropriate to require the em-
ployer to consult employees with respect to the decision's effects." 3
Significantly, the employee concerns which gave rise to the
Vredeling Proposal-concerns over the closure of plants and the ac-
quisition of companies-involve precisely those decisions which
may not be amenable to the collective bargaining process, as ex-
plained by the United States Supreme Court in First National Main-
tenance Corp. A requirement that management consult employees
with respect to such decisions could lead to more rather than fewer
confrontations between management and labor, depending upon the
structure of labor relations in the particular European country
involved. 114
112. Id. at 681.
113. Id at 681-82.
114. For instance, in England, the trade unions have a greater tradition of confrontation;
the present conservative government has been attempting to shift the balance of power away
from the trade unions. See Notfor Spiking. Britain's Trade Unions Have to Be Kept Subject
to the Rule of Law, Chiefly/or Decent Trade Unionists' Sake, EcONOMIST, Dec. 3-9, 1983, at
12. The Vredeling Proposal would upset these plans by shifting more power back to the
trade unions by entitling them to consult with management over decisions not currently
subject to collective bargaining.
By contrast, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Works Constitution Act provides
for the dissemination of certain information to, and consultation with, employees concerning
decisions regarding matters at the shop-floor level, such as working hours, overtime, work-
ing surroundings and dismissals. Thus, the Vredeling Proposal would not appear to be
wholly inconsistent with the current state of labor relations in Germany. Because the
Vredeling Proposal differs from the German Works Constitution Act in certain aspects,
however, the proposal might disrupt the current balance between trade unions and manage-
ment. For instance, the Works Constitution Act embraces the notion that employee bodies
should be independent from trade unions. See Opinion of Federation of German Employ-
ers' Association on the EEC Commission Proposal for a Directive on the Information and
Consultation of Employees in Companies with a Complex Structure, Particularly Transna-
tional 5 (Jan. 27, 1981); Kolvenbach, Industrial Democracy. Legal Developments in Europe
1977-1979, 1 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 84 (1980). In contrast, the Vredeling
Proposal provides for consultations with employee representatives who will often be trade
union officials. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, art. 1(e). Similarly, the German Works
Constitution Act contains an absolute obligation to maintain industrial peace. In contrast,
the Vredeling Proposal, by providing that consultations are to be held with a "view to at-
tempting to reach agreement," envisions the possibility that agreements may be reached, if
necessary, through industrial confrontation. Opinion of Federation of German Employers'
Association, supra note 114, at 5. Finally, although the Works Constitution Act does pro-
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B. The Proposed Ninth Directive on Company Law
The proposed Ninth Directive on Company Law is expected to
be formally presented by the European Commission in the near fu-
ture. "1 5 It will then be submitted for comment to the European Par-
liament and the Economic and Social Committee. As of the date of
this Article, the official version has not been released, but the radical
nature of its drafts has already elicited protests from organizations
representing businesses and multinational enterprises."16
A draft of the European Commission's proposed Ninth Direc-
tive indicates that it would challenge the legal practice of limiting a
company's liability to its equity value. Even further, it would sub-
ject the board members of a parent company--even one outside of
the EEC-to joint and several unlimited personal liability or other
sanctions if they make a decision harmful to the interests of a sub-
sidiary within the EEC.' 17 Specifically, the draft encourages parent
companies to acquire by contract, namely a control contract, the
right to manage their subsidiaries in the interests of the group."l8
vide for consultations with general works councils, which deal with questions concerning the
whole company, its primary emphasis is on matters at the shop-floor level. Id The Vredel-
ing Proposal, on the other hand, places the locus of consultations on the highest level em-
ployee body. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, art. 5.
115. See supra notes 18-19. Because of the priority which the Commission has placed on
the adoption of the Vredeling Proposal and Fifth Directive, official promulgation of the
Ninth Directive may be delayed.
116. Both the National Foreign Trade Council, a private, non-profit organization of
more than 650 United States companies engaged in foreign trade and investment, and the
Council of American Chambers of Commerce (European and Mediterranean) have submit-
ted papers in opposition to the draft Ninth Directive. See Memorandum Concerning the
Proposed Ninth E.C. Directive on Company Law by the National Foreign Trade Council
(Nov. 20, 1981); Memorandum on the Proposed Ninth Directive on Company Law of the
Council of American Chambers of Commerce-European and Mediterranean (July 1981).
These organizations object to the draft Directive's extension of joint and several unlimited
liability to the members of a parent company's management board where the parent com-
pany's management undertakes actions attributable to mismanagement which damage a
subsidiary. Art. 6(3)(a). Additionally, industry bristles at the requirement that the manage-
ment body of each subsidiary prepare a special report describing significant measures which
the subsidiary has taken or failed to take on the initiative of the parent company, identifying
those measures which have been detrimental to the subsidiary, art. 7(2), (3), and thus invit-
ing litigation. They view the likelihood of litigation to be particularly great since any bene-
fits from those measures may not to be included in the report. Art. 7(3)(c). On the other
hand, to avoid these obligations, the parent company must enter into a control contract,
implementation of which requires that the minority shareholders of the subsidiary be offered
the option of selling their shares. Art. 14
117. Ninth Company Law Directive, supra note 18, arts. 6(3) & 10.
118. Failure to enter into a "control" contract subjects the board members of the parent
company to joint and several unlimited liability for mismanagement vir-k-vPis the subsidiary
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The contract entitles the parent company to manage the subsidiary;
however, the parent must exercise its powers with the "care of a
conscientious director and in the group interest."" 9 The parent will
be held liable for the obligations of the subsidiary arising during the
contractual period unless the subsidiary's failure to satisfy its obliga-
tions is not the result of the parent's influence. 120 When such a
"control contract" is implemented, minority shareholders of the
subsidiary must be offered the choice of selling their shares.' 2'
If the parent company does not enter into such a contract, the
draft deems any parent which directly or indirectly exercises a "de-
cisive" influence over the decision-making of a subsidiary a defacto
member of the subsidiary's management, and holds the parent liable
to the subsidiary for any damage resulting from the parent's "inter-
ference and attributable to mismanagement."' 22 Arguably, a deci-
sion by the parent company to eliminate or transfer a subsidiary's
operations, although economically sound for the enterprise as a
whole, could be considered such "interference" from the point of
view of the subsidiary's employees. 23 In a controversial provision,
the draft holds the directors of the parent company jointly and sev-
erally liable for such conduct.
24
Finally, the draft requires that each subsidiary in the EEC pro-
vide a special report, stating all agreements with the parent or its
subsidiaries, as well as significant measures which the subsidiary has
taken or failed to take on the initiative of the parent, which are det-
rimental to the subsidiary. 25 Such reports themselves could gener-
ate litigation since they must be published. 126 Moreover, any
shareholder, creditor or employee representative can apply to a
court to appoint a special auditor where the special report refers to
detrimental measures or where such detriment is otherwise al-
and necessitates the annual preparation of a special report which identifies actions and omis-
sions by the parent company which are harmful to the subsidiary. Art. 7. See supra note
116; Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the European Community,
14 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 293, 317 (1982).
119. The Ninth Directive, supra note 18, art. 25.
120. Id art. 29(2).
121. Id. arts. 14 & 15.
122. Id. art. 6.
123. See Memorandum Concerning the Proposed Ninth E.C. Directive on Company
Law, supra note 116, at 3.
124. The Ninth Directive, supra note 18, art. 6; see supra note 116.
125. Id art. 7; see supra note 116.
126. Id art. 8(2)
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leged. 27 If the court determines that the parent company interfered
in the management of the subsidiary, causing it damage, it may or-
der suspension from office of one or more members of the manage-
ment or supervisory body, revoke the damaging measures, or order
the parent company to offer to purchase the shares held by the sub-
sidiary's shareholders. 
28
It should be apparent that the proposal addresses the same is-
sue addressed in the Badger case discussed in connection with the
OECD Guidelines: the extent to which a parent is liable for the
obligations which its subsidiary is unable to perform. The proposal,
however, goes well beyond the Badger case, which considered the
parent company's obligation to be only morally based and limited to
the circumstances.
29
Because industry groups 30 view the Ninth Directive as one of
the most radical proposals by the European Commission, these
groups have expressed great concern over, and opposition to, the
draft measure.13'
C. The Proposed Ffth Directive
The EEC's proposed Fifth Directive concerns employee partici-
pation in management. 132 Although it is not aimed specifically at
multinational enterprises, it would have a significant impact on any
multinational enterprise with subsidiaries in the EEC.133 Because it
has met great opposition, 34 little progress had been made toward its
enactment until recently. 135 On July 28, 1983, however, the Com-
127. Id art. 9.
128. Id art. 10.
129. See supra note 39.
130. Eg., the National Foreign Trade Council, the Council of American Chamber of
Commerce-Europe and Mediterranean. See supra note 116.
131. See National Foreign Trade Council's Memorandum Concerning Proposed Ninth
EC Directive on Company Law, supra note 116; Council of American Chambers of Com-
merce- Europe and Mediterranean, supra note 116.
132. Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16.
133. Any company employing, on average, a number of persons which equals or exceeds
the level fixed by each member state (which cannot exceed 1,000) must provide for employee
participation pursuant to the directive. Id arts. 4 & 21(b). Since employees of subsidiaries
in the EEC can be counted as employees of the enterprise for purposes of satisfying the
required minimum, id arts. 4(l) & 21(b), multinational companies with subsidiaries in the
EEC would be subject to the proposed directive.
134. Opposition has been particularly great in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Den-
mark. Ottervanger & Pais, Employee Participation in Corporate Decision Making: The Dutch
Model, 15 THE INT'L LAW. 393, 407 (1981).
135. The proposal for the Fifth Directive was first presented by the European Commis-
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mission approved a revised draft and has submitted it to the Council
of Ministers to be considered for adoption.
36
The proposed Fifth Directive would require companies em-
ploying a minimum number of employees, which cannot be fixed by
any member state at more than one thousand, 37 to provide for em-
ployee participation in management through one or more of the fol-
lowing alternatives:138 (1) participation through employee
representatives on a supervisory board 39 or as non-executive mem-
bers of a management board; 140 (2) participation of employees on a
supervisory board by co-optation (the Dutch model); 14 (3) partici-
sion to the Council of Ministers on October 9, 1972. 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 49
(Dec. 13, 1972).
136. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16, at 2.
137. See supra note 133.
138. Since the proposal is in the form of a directive, each member state would be free to
implement it within the minimum standards provided therein. See supra note 8 1.
139. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16, art. 4(b). This option is
applicable to companies with a two-tier system, i.e., companies which have a management
board and a supervisory board. For such companies, the management board is responsible
for managing the business of the company, whereas the supervisory board is responsible for
controlling the management body. See Preamble to Amended Proposal for a Fifth Direc-
tive, supra note 16. Specifically, the members of the management board may be dismissed
by the supervisory board, id art. 13, and the supervisory board's authorization must be
obtained for major decisions, such as those relating to the closure or transfer of the enter-
prise, the substantial curtailment or extension of the activities of the enterprise, substantial
organizational changes and the establishment of long-term cooperation with other enter-
prises or the termination thereof. Id art. 12(1). Currently, only the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Netherlands have a two-tier system comprised of a management board
and supervisory board. Ottervanger & Pais, supra note 134, at 407.
140. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16, art. 21(a), (b). The Fifth
Directive presupposes that where a company only has a management body (as opposed to an
additional supervisory board), a defacto distinction within that body exists between execu-
tive members who manage the business of the company and non-executive members who
confine themselves to supervision. See Preamble to Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive,
supra note 16. Where a state permits a company to have a one-tier system, the proposed
Fifth Directive provides that the executive members of the management board will be ap-
pointed by the non-executive members. Id art. 21(a). The directive would then provide for
employee participation in the appointment of the non-executive members. Id art. 21(b), (d).
141. Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16, art. 4(c). The concept of co-
optation is derived from the Dutch Civil Code in connection with the supervisory boards for
larger companies. See Ottervanger & Pais, supra note 134, at 403. Under the co-optation
concept, the supervisory board actually selects its own members, although the shareholders
and work council are entitled to make recommendations concerning selection. Id. at 404.
Under Dutch law, however, the shareholders and work councils can veto an appointment of
a person believed to be unsuitable, or whose appointment would cause the supervisory
board to be improperly constituted. In such an instance, the supervisory board, if it still
wishes to appoint that person, must seek a finding from an independent body that the objec-
tions are not justified. Id Accordingly, like its Dutch model, article 4(c) of the Fifth Direc-
tive provides that with respect to the co-optation alternative, "members of the supervisory
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pation through the establishment of an employees' representative
body with rights of consultation and to information; 42 or (4) em-
ployee participation pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, subject to prescribed minimum standards of
participation. 143
These alternatives are intended to assuage the critics of the pre-
vious draft of the Fifth Directive which would have required that
companies establish a two-level board system for employee partici-
pation. Currently, only the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Netherlands have a two-tiered system, comprised of a supervisory
board with employee membership, which appoints and oversees a
management board responsible for managing the business of the
company. 144 Under the revised proposal, the other option of a sin-
gle management body is allowed. Whether there is a supervisory
board or a single management body, however, employees would
have at least one-third and a maximum of one-half of the seats of
the supervisory board or of the non-executive membership on the
organ shall be appointed by co-optation by that organ," and it permits the shareholders or
employee representatives to object to the appointment of a proposed candidate on the
ground either that he lacks the ability to carry out his duties or that, if he were appointed,
the supervisory organ would be improperly constituted with regard to the interests of the
company, the shareholders and the employees.
142. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16, arts. 4(2), 4(d), (e). Under
this option, an employee body has the right to regular information and consultation on the
"administration, situation, progress and prospects of the company, its competitive position,
credit situation and investment plans." Id art. 4(d). The employee body must also be con-
sulted before the supervisory board authorizes decisions relating to the closure or transfer of
the enterprise or of substantial parts thereof, the substantial curtailment or extension of the
activities of the enterprise, or substantial organizational changes in the enterprise. This al-
ternative is available for companies with either the two-tier system, id art. 4(2), or a one-tier
system. Id art. 21(b)(2).
143. Id arts. 4(2), 4(e) & 21(0. This alternative is available for companies with either a
two-tier, id 4(2), or a one-tier system. Id art. 21(b)(2). For companies with a two-tier sys-
tem, the members of the supervisory board would be appointed (i) by employee vote (up to a
maximum of one-half of the board) or (ii) by co-optation. Id art. 4(f). In the alternative,
the collective bargaining agreements would have to provide for the right of employee repre-
sentatives to regular information and consultation with the company's management board
on "the administration, situation, progress and prospects of the company, its competitive
position, credit situation, and investment plans." Id art. 4(g). In addition, the collective
bargaining agreement would have to provide for employee consultation before the supervi-
sory board authorizes decisions relating to, inter alia, the closure or transfer of the enterprise,
the substantial curtailment or extension of the activities of the enterprise, or substantial or-
ganizational changes within the enterprise. Id arts. 4(g) & 12. Similar requirements would
apply to one-tier companies. Id art. 21(g), (h).
144. See supra note 139; Schneebaum, supra note 118, at 308-09.
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single management board. 45
As might be expected, this proposal has been vigorously op-
posed by business organizations. 146
V. CONCLUSION
Since World War II, the increasing desire of sovereign nations
to control their economies in an active manner inevitably has di-
rected attention to multinational enterprises, a business form per-
ceived as one which was least subject to any individual sovereign's
control. The OECD Declaration and ILO Tripartite Declaration
were the results of a multinational effort to set guidelines for their
behavior. Their flexibility insured their support; the multinational
nature of the effort guaranteed that they would not discourage in-
vestment in any particular location.
However, some of the proposed legislation in the EEC suffers
from two defects. First, because the EEC has a smaller membership
than the OECD, it cannot guarantee that its legislation will not sim-
ply encourage investment outside, rather than inside, the EEC. Sec-
ond, by proposing measures which increase corporate obligations
and liabilities, the proposed legislation increases the costs of doing
business in the EEC.
Nonetheless, measures which increase employee consultation
or enhance employee protection can be salutary to the efficiency of
the enterprise's operations and attitude of the employees. However,
some of the proposed legislation also protects employees by granting
them increased rights with which to resist change (rather than sim-
ply mitigate its consequences). Since economies are in constant
flux, protection against change impedes the flexibility necessary to
adjust to it. Indeed, the consequence of absolute protection is the
maintenance of the status quo, and those who maintain the status
quo will ultimately be outcompeted by those who do not. Hence,
measures which approach absolute protection can cause the reduced
growth and increased unemployment which the measures were in-
tended to mitigate in the first place. While it may be concluded that
the benefits of such legislation outweigh its risks, care must be taken
that those same risks do not cancel, rather than simply balance,
those benefits.
145. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, supra note 16, arts. 4(b) & 21(d).
146. See Schneebaum, supra note 118, at 308-09.
